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The main problem discussed in this paper is whether a balance of payments con-
straint exists within the Euro area. It is argued that the question of a member state’s
foreign position is still relevant, at difference from what happens in successful cur-
rency areas like the USA, where persistent imbalances in the payments from one dis-
trict to another are acceptable and are made sustainable by financial transfers
revolving around the system of taxes and transfers and the public debt. A currency
area is an area where the price of a deposit with the banking system is the same
wherever the deposit is held (i.e. there is uniformity in the value of commercial bank
money). Persistent imbalances in payments between regions within the area are to be
settled in either the common currency or (which is basically the same thing) the
public debt. But while this is acceptable in the USA, it is far from acceptable in the
Euro area, where creditor countries (Germany being by far the most important)
clamour for a settlement in ‘hard assets’, like, e.g. state-owned real estate, if not
gold. This means that a balance of payments constraint still binds state members of
the Euro area, and is a serious threat to its survival.
JEL Classification: E58; F32; F42; H71; H72
I. INTRODUCTION
It would appear as a now largely accepted view that the economic crisis in which
Europe has been entangled for the last 4 or 5 years has shown that there are faults
in the architecture of the European Monetary Union.
Disregarding the explanations according to which the root of the problems lies in
the profligacy of some of the states which are part to this union, the analysis which
is generally regarded as the most satisfactory (or least unsatisfactory) is that which
adopts the standpoint of the literature on Optimal Currency Areas. So far as this lit-
erature does not conceive the establishment of an optimal currency area as the
‘natural’ result of market forces—in particular, of complete freedom of capital
movements—it can envisage fiscal policy as something which, rather than being a
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cause of disruption, may have a role to play—through its redistributive and stabiliz-
ing functions—in overcoming the structural problems of a currency area. Many
authors who move in this perspective share the view that at the core of the problems
within the Euro area there is a lack of fiscal capacity at the federal level. However, as
soon as an explanation is given of how this lack of fiscal capacity would affect the
(mal)functioning of the area, and in particular, how it should be remedied, one
finds that the view which has come to prevail is that distributive neutrality and a
balanced budget must be warranted.1 A federal fiscal policy is invoked not in order
to ensure adequate levels of aggregate demand in the longer term, but simply to
provide a ‘fiscal insurance’—, i.e., an insurance cover against unanticipated country-
specific shocks, which the private financial market would not be able to provide, as a
consequence of imperfections to its functioning. This approach reflects the idea (i)
that no question of aggregate demand exists in the longer term; therefore, the level
of production has a trend which is ‘natural’, affected only by the ‘fundamental
forces of productivity and thrift’, and the problem is simply that of not allowing tem-
porary deviations from it (permanent shocks being only susceptible to be managed
through wage and price deflation and labour force migration); (ii) that the need for
a federal fiscal policy is linked to the asymmetric nature of temporary shocks across
countries, so that support for the negative production gap in some countries would
be offered by the positive production gap in others, through a purely redistributive
fiscal policy; a federal fiscal policy ought to be essentially distributionally neutral in
the longer term, as nobody would accept to be permanently deprived of part of
what he produces in exchange for nothing.
The optimal currency area theory is in essence the study of the conditions to be sat-
isfied for the regions composing it to have a balance of (current) payments equilib-
rium in the medium/long term: in fact a currency area is regarded as optimal not
because there is no external equilibrium condition between its regions to be satisfied,
but because it would tend towards an equilibrium in which each of the single regions
would reach an even balance of current payments. This literature regards the experi-
ence of individual nation states as evidence of an optimal currency area. It is notice-
able instead that a single state or a true federation of states—the optimal currency
area par excellence—often shows the opposite feature: a persistent external disequilib-
rium between its single regions. A currency area is viable if it allows persistent imbal-
ances to take place in the current account of the regions of which it is composed. In
other words, a viable currency area is an area within which there is no binding balance
of payments constraint. For example, between states of the USA, there is no doubt
that some are persistently net importers from the rest of the country.2 The same is
1 See for example Wolff (2012).
2 It is to be noticed that, while there is a wealth of statistics on US inter-state commodity flows,
statistics on the inter-state current accounts are hardly available, and completely absent from the US
politico-economic debate.
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true within the single European countries.3 A second point to emphasize is that in the
decades preceding the economic and monetary union, fiscal policy within individual
European countries was not limited to the contrast of temporary shocks. It was aimed
at ensuring adequate levels of aggregate demand, regardless of the uncertain distinc-
tion between temporary and permanent deviations of production from its alleged
natural (long-term) growth rate.
The two issues of the external constraint and persistent budget deficits are closely
linked. Nation states are in fact viable currency areas not because they simply
oppose temporary and asymmetric shocks, but because—not having within themselves
a balance of payments constraint—they could pursue expansionary fiscal policies
without worrying about keeping a balanced current account between all sub-areas
composing them. From this point of view, the central issue is to understand why
what works within individual or federal nation states does not work in the set of
European countries that have introduced a common currency.
We may notice here that there has been a considerable shift in the opinion on
whether the external constraint exists or not as among the member countries of the
Euro area. In a rather triumphant report of the European Commission on the occa-
sion of the 10th anniversary of the Euro it was unreservedly asserted that in the
Euro area ‘current account constraints and exchange risk premiums have disap-
peared’ (EU, 2008, p. 152). Behind this complacent view, there was not so much
the idea that the external constraint within the union had been eliminated, but
rather that the abolition of exchange rates and complete freedom of capital move-
ments were sufficient to ensure that the current account of each member state would
have tended to balance. After the global financial crisis hit the Euro zone, many had
second thoughts, and started to maintain that the European common currency ‘is
not by itself sufficient to make the notion [of a Member State’s foreign position] ir-
relevant’ (Giavazzi & Spaventa, 2010, p. 10). There would seem to be at present a
consensus on this position. Yet, it seems to us that no clear explanation has been
provided of why and through which mechanisms the question of a member state’s
foreign position is still relevant, at difference from what happens in successful cur-
rency areas as for example the USA.
The present paper addresses this issue with a particular emphasis on the role of
federal fiscal policies in the Euro area. Our line of reasoning is that, even within a
single country, growth is never a territorially homogeneous process, and persistent
differences in growth rates between different areas of the country tend to create per-
sistent imbalances. If we look at examples of currency areas which have lasted for a
long time without breaking up, these persistent real imbalances are accepted by
surplus regions and are made sustainable by financial transfers revolving around the
system of taxes and transfers and the public debt. According to those who believe
3 A particularly interesting (and intriguing) case in point is that of unified Germany, which, after an
initial stage when it seemed that a catching-up process had been triggered, is now exhibiting the classical
scenario of a dual system in which backward Eastern regions are net importers from the rest of the
country. This situation does not appear to be a threat to the monetary unity of the country.
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that market forces can correct imbalances of a real kind (i.e. through wage and price
deflation, or through factor mobility), it is preferable to leave the real imbalances un-
managed, since this would automatically lead to their elimination. From our stand-
point, these stabilizing market forces do not exist, and the fact that the financial
management is successful is viewed positively, since imbalances would otherwise
become unsustainable, leading to the fragmentation of the area. A federal fiscal
policy in the European Union should play a much larger role than that of offering
insurance against asymmetric fiscal shocks or that of ensuring a stabilizing fund
from which to draw financial resources in emergency situations.
The paper is divided into five sections. In Section 1, we present the main data on
differences in per capita GDP and personal income between the states of the
European Union and of the USA; then a comparison is offered of the differences
between the various states of the Euro area and between their regions. Section 2
compares federal and local tax and transfer systems in Europe and in the USA.
Section 3 discusses the question of the settlement of external imbalances. Section 4
explains how imbalances in the payments of the countries of the Euro area are
financed by the European Central Bank through the TARGET system, and makes a
comparison between it and the ISA system—the US counterpart to the TARGET
system. Section 5 draws the main implications of our argument regarding the goals
of public finance in the EU.
II. TERRITORIAL DISPARITIES, REGIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE INFLOWS
AND CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS
Growth is never a territorially homogeneous process. Territorial differences in per
capita output and income are substantial. This is true not only for inter-state differ-
ences, but also for inter-regional differences within the same state.
Despite relevant statistical problems,4 some facts and trends concerning USA and
Europe’s territorial disparities are well defined. The most important facts appear to
be the following:
(i) Although personal income inequality is larger in the USA than in Europe and
manufacturing is more geografically concentrated in the USA than in Europe,
inter-state inequality in per capita gross domestic product in the European
Union is twice that in the USA. This result changes when considering the
4 A comparison of per capita regional output is not a simple task to perform. First, results are strongly
dependent on the size of the area chosen as a reference point (in the present paper, we will refer to the
EU’s NUTS2 regional breakdown). Moreover, a meaningful comparison should be made in real terms (by
deflating RGDP). When these comparisons cover longer periods of time and/or regions that have different
price dynamics and currencies, price deflators are not consistent in both the time and space dimensions:
all the pitfalls of using Purchasing Power Parities cannot be avoided, and they are made worse by the
comparison of years distant from each other. Finally, the various measures of regional income inequality
may give different results. On the effects of using PPP data, see Gasic & Kurkowiak (2012). On the
various measures of regional income inequality, see Shankar & Shah (2003, pp. 1422–25).
A. BARBA AND G. DE VIVO76
group of European states that are part of the Euro area. This group of states
has a dispersion in the average levels of per capita product similar to that of the
states that make up the USA.
(ii) During the period of time from World War II until the end of the 1970s, differ-
ences in per capita output across US states5 and across European states nar-
rowed substantially: the high growth period saw a reduction in inter-state
inequalities. Since the end of the 1970s, the trend towards greater income
equality has been reversed.
(iii) The halt in the trend towards inter-state income equality is clearly recorded in
the USA, while in Europe it is partially obscured by the entry of new countries
into the community. Some of these new entrants have actually recorded higher
growth rates than core countries, therefore closing the gap between the set of
EU27 states. In any case, it remains true that also in Europe, since the begin-
ning of the 1980s, there is an increase in inter-state disparities if we consider
only the core countries of the monetary union.
(iv) In Europe, there is no decrease in intra-state regional inequality (whether new
entrants are excluded or not). The years when European states reached an ex-
ceptionally high level of economic and financial integration did not favour any
recovery of the less developed regions of the countries that make up the
European project.6 Intra-state inequality has been more pronounced in the new
entrants that have approached the levels of the average per capita output of the
core countries, and less marked (in some cases it has actually decreased), in the
core European countries, which instead saw their product stagnate.
(v) Per capita Regional Primary Income (RPI)—the income of private households
cashed in a given region regardless of its source—is less unequally distributed
than per capita Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP). Per capita
Regional Disposable Income (RDI)—which is obtained when monetary trans-
fers less taxes on income and wealth are added to the RPI—is less unequally
distributed than per capita RPI. The state action, therefore, plays an important
role in levelling regional inequalities. In Europe, this levelling is strong but
remains confined within each state; in the USA it is less relevant, but it occurs
both within states and between states (more on this in Section 2).
(vi) In Europe, regions within a single state record persistent imbalances in their ex-
ternal trade, while the external trade for the state as a whole tends to be
balanced. Over the last decade, some new EU entrants showed imbalances in
the external trade also at the national level. In the USA, there are regional
imbalances in the external trade both within each state and between different
states.
5 On US state per capita income long-run trend, see Coughlin & Mandelbaum (1988).
6 On the worsening of intra-state income inequality in the EMU see Bouvet (2010). See also Martin
(2001).
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Figure 1a shows the dispersion of average state per capita GDP in the European
countries and in the USA over the last decade.7 In all US states per capita GDP,
weighted on the basis of the state population, differed from the national value by an
average of 10% in 1997, and by an average of 14% in 2011. In the Euro area, there
is a decrease from 10% in 1997 to 7.9% in 2002, and it is then trendless until 2009,
when it starts to increase, reaching back 10% in 2011. The dispersion in the EU27
area instead fell from 26% in 1997 to 17% in 2009 (a reduction which is due to the
strong growth of some new entrants), and then halted.8
Figure 1b repeats the same calculation shown in Figure 1a for the three main
countries of the Euro area (Germany, France and Italy), starting with 1960. In the
three decades from 1960 to 1990, the dispersion of per capita GDP between these
three countries (which represent more than 60% of the population and of the
product of the whole Euro area) halved (from 18 to 9%). In 1991, a further reduc-
tion was entirely due to German unification, and the consequent lowering of
German per capita GDP towards that of France and Italy. Since the early 1990s, the
convergence process has stopped, and over the last decade there has actually been
FIGURE 1A. Dispersion in per capita GDP between states in Europe and in the USA (PPP E
and chained 2005 US$) (Source: BEA and EUROSTAT).
7 For a given territory (a single state or a federation of states) the dispersion index is given by the sum
of the absolute differences between average GDP (or income) per inhabitant in each sub-area of that
territory (y) and whole territory’s GDP (or income) per inhabitant (Y), weighted on the basis of the
sub-area share of population (p/P), and expressed in percent of the territorial GDP (or income) per
inhabitant: D ¼ 100 1
Y
Xn
i¼1
yi  Yð Þj j pi
P
 
. For a detailed analysis of the convergence process among the
regions of EU27, see Eurostat (2012, pp. 18–30).
8 Using non-PPP data a similar trend for the European countries can be detected, although in
correspondence of higher levels of dispersion.
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an inversion, mainly due to slower growth of per capita output in Italy (the differ-
ence between Germany and France not having substantially risen).
After dealing with dispersion between US states and between EU states, we can
turn to dispersion within each EU17 state. The details of each EU17 state are
recorded in Table 1 for the year 2009. While between the 17 Euro countries disper-
sion is 7.5%, within these countries it is 23% for France, 22.3% for Italy and 16.1%
for Germany—a dispersion generated by the centre–periphery divide in France, the
North–South divide in Italy and the West–East divide in Germany.9 In any case, it
remains true that within the Euro countries the spread in RGDP is much higher
than inter-member state dispersion: in Austria, which has the lowest level of
intra-state dispersion (15%), this is twice the level of inter-state dispersion.
Narrowing the focus to the main core countries, this still holds, though attenuated
by the reversion of the long run trend in inter-state disparity recorded since the in-
ception of the Maastricht Treaty.
In Tables 2 and 3, the dispersion indexes for the same set of regions are given for
both per capita regional income and per capita regional disposable income. The
passage from per capita RGDP to per capita primary income shows a reduction in the
dispersion, mainly due to the fact that incomes generated in metropolitan areas spread
to adjacent regions.10 However, the most productive regions tend to coincide with
those that host wealthier individuals, except for very small states in which the difference
between the regions in which wealth is produced and that in which it is cashed
FIGURE 1B. Dispersion in per capita GDP between Germany, France and Italy (2005 market
prices) (source: AMECO).
9 Germany’s dispersion is largely mitigated by the different price levels in the two parts of the country.
On the other hand, France’s territorial dispersion is of a different nature than that of the other countries:
excluding Iˆle de France, the dispersion index (c. 10%) is the lowest among the EU17 countries.
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becomes somewhat meaningless (the Netherlands is a case in point). Of greater inter-
est, for our line of argument, is the comparison of per capita RPI and per capita RDI.
TABLE 1.
Per capita GDP and RGDP in the Euro area NUTS2 regions in 2009 (1000 PPP E)
Country Poorest region Richest region
Max/Min
ratio
Dispersion
coefficient
Belgium 27.7 Prov. Hainaut 18.1 Re´gion de
Bruxelles
52.5 2.9 24.2
Germany 27.2 Brandenburg –
Nordost
18.4 Hamburg 44.1 2.4 16.1
France 25.4 Picardie 19.4 Iˆle de France 41.5 2.2 23.1
Italy 24.4 Campania 15.8 Lombardia 31.3 2.0 22.4
Austria 29.3 Burgenland 19.8 Wien 37.9 1.9 15.1
The Netherlands 31.0 Flevoland 22.7 Groningen 40.0 1.8 17.0
Spain 24.2 Extremadura 16.9 Comunidad
de Madrid
31.9 1.9 18.5
Portugal 18.8 Norte 14.9 Lisboa 26.4 1.8 34.3
Ireland 30.0 Border, Mid.
and West.
20.8 Southern
and
Eastern
33.3 1.6 23.0
Greece 22.1 Ipeiros 15.3 Attiki 29.1 1.9 33.0
Slovenia 20.5 Vzhodna
Slovenija
16.9 Zahodna
Slovenija
24.6 1.5 28.5
Slovakia 17.0 Vy´chodne´
Slovensko
11.5 Bratislavsky´
kraj
41.8 3.6 44.7
Finland 26.9 Ita¨-Suomi 20.0 A˚land 38.5 1.9 23.1
Cyprus 23.5 – – – – – –
Estonia 14.9 – – – – – –
Malta 19.3 – – – – – –
Luxembourg 62.5 – – – – – –
Source: EUROSTAT.
10 See for example the cases of Re´gion de Bruxelles-Capitale and the case of Groningen both of which
lose the primacy of the richest region, or the case of Iˆle de France which, while maintaining this primacy,
records a per capita net primary income equal to 60% of its per capita RGDP.
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This shows a steady reduction in dispersion, clearly seen in France, Germany and Italy,
even though in Italy it starts from much higher levels of spatial dispersion.
Regions which record a disposable income higher than primary income are not so
common. In spite of this, the poorest regions almost always have a disposable
income about equal to their primary income, while in rich regions the disposable
TABLE 2.
Per capita household PI and RPI in the Euro area NUTS2 regions in 2009 (1000 PPP E)
Country Poorest region Richest region
Max/min
ratio
Dispersion
coefficient
Belgium 20.4 Prov. Hainaut 15.9 Prov. Vlaams-
Brabant
26.0 1.6 11.6
Germany 20.7 Chemnitz 14.2 Hamburg 27.2 1.9 12.6
France 18.9 Languedoc-
Roussillon
15.5 Iˆle de France 26.6 1.7 14.3
Italya 17.5 Calabria 11.1 Lombardia 22.5 2.0 22.9
Austria 20.9 Ka¨rnten 19.1 Vorarlberg 22.5 1.2 3.4
The
Netherlands
19.9 Groningen 16.5 Utrecht 23.0 1.4 18.3
Spain 16.2 Extremadura 11.5 Comunidad
de Madrid
21.5 1.9 18.9
Portugal 11.7 Norte 9.5 Lisboa 16.3 1.7 39.1
Ireland 15.8 Border, Mid.
and Wes.
13.0 Southern and
Eastern
16.9 1.3 22.3
Greece 14.5 Dytiki Ellada 11.4 Attiki 17.7 1.6 29.7
Slovenia 13.3 Vzhodna
Slovenija
12.1 Zahodna
Slovenija
14.7 1.2 24.5
Slovakia 10.2 Vy´chodne´
Slovensko
7.8 Bratislavsky´
kraj
19.1 2.5 39.7
Finland 16.6 Ita¨-Suomi 13.2 A˚land 20.3 1.5 24.8
Cyprus 14.7 – – – – – –
Estonia 8.0 – – – – – –
Malta – – – – – – –
Luxembourg 24.1 – – – – – –
Source: EUROSTAT.
a2006.
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income is consistently lower than the primary income. Put otherwise, the poor
regions receive an amount of public transfers approximately equal to the amount of
tax paid (regional government spending being thus entirely deficit financed), while
in rich regions the balance between taxes and transfers records a surplus that in
TABLE 3.
Per capita household DI and RDI in the Euro area NUTS2 regions in 2009 (1000 PPP E)
Country Poorest region Richest region
Max/min
ratio
Dispersion
coefficient
Belgium 16.6 Prov. Hainaut 14.4 Prov. Vlaams-
Brabant
19.7 1.4 8.1
Germany 17.9 Mecklenburg-
Vorpom.
14.4 Hamburg 22.8 1.6 8.1
France 16.8 Nord - Pas-
de-Calais
14.6 Iˆle de France 20.7 1.4 7.5
Italya 15.5 Campania 10.9 Emilia
Romagna
19.3 1.8 18.9
Austria 18.4 Ka¨rnten 17.6 Niedero¨sterreich 20.0 1.1 3.4
The
Netherlands
14.3 Groningen 11.9 Utrecht 16.0 1.3 19.3
Spain 14.8 Extremadura 11.3 Paı´s Vasco 19.7 1.7 15.2
Portugal 11.7 Norte 10.0 Lisboa 14.7 1.4 32.3
Ireland 15.1 Border, Mid.
and Wes.
13.6 Southern and
Eastern
15.7 1.2 18.7
Greece 15.1 Ionia Nisia 12.1 Attiki 18.1 1.5 27.7
Slovenia 12.1 Vzhodna
Slovenija
11.4 Zahodna
Slovenija
13.0 1.1 23.2
Slovakia 9.6 Vy´chodne´
Slovensko
8.0 Bratislavsky´
kraj
15.1 1.9 34.3
Finland 14.1 Ita¨-Suomi 12.7 A˚land 16.5 1.3 21.7
Cyprus 14.7 – – – – – –
Estonia 7.4 – – – – – –
Malta – – – – – – –
Luxembourg 22.9 – – – – – –
Source: EUROSTAT.
a2006.
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some cases outpaces regional public spending. For example, in Belgium’s poorest
region (Prov. Hainault) private households’ disposable income is equal to 90% of
primary income; in the richest region (Prov. Vlaams-Brabant) it is equal to 75%. In
Languedoc-Roussillon (the poorest French region in terms of primary income) this
ratio is 98%; in Iˆle the France, the richest region, it is 78%. In Germany, Chemnitz
shows a ratio of 106%, Hamburg of 84%. In Italy, Calabria has a ratio of 100%,
Lombardia records a ratio of 83%. In Spain’s poorest region (Extremadura) the
ratio is 98%; in the Comunidad de Madrid it is 83%. The calculation of the fiscal
residual is of course a very complicated exercise, which cannot be carried out by
simply subtracting taxes from transfers. However, the way in which these net trans-
fers move is on the whole clear: in all European countries rich regions subsidize
poor regions to a greater or lesser degree, and in an amount which depends on the
more or less restrictive fiscal policy stance.
These net financial transfers between regions are associated with a corresponding
flow of real resources. Territorial differences in income levels as between regions do
not by themselves necessarily imply corresponding external imbalances. As a matter
of fact, however, richer regions tend to generate a flow of net exports towards poorer
regions of the same state. This can be seen as the counterpart of the system of tax
and expenditure showing a positive balance (taxes. expenditure) for richer regions,
and a negative balance (taxes , expenditure) for poorer regions. It is in fact the
system of taxes and expenditure which allows an imbalance between exports and
imports to go on without an indefinitely rising indebtedness of the poorer towards
the richer regions. Figure 2 shows the net flow of exports (per capita) for each
Italian region in 2009 (regions are ordered starting from the highest net flow).
FIGURE 2. Italy 2009. Current public finance balance and net exports by region (E per
capita) (source: ISTAT).
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Figure 2 also shows the difference between per capita current revenues and current
public expenditure for each Italian region. The richest region (Lombardia) records a
substantial public finance surplus accompanied by a current account surplus. The
same (with opposite sign) is shown for the poorest region (Calabria).
III. THE TINY EU FEDERAL BUDGET
If we look at the 27 EU countries as a single federated state, it would appear as
almost completely deprived of a system of federal revenue and expenditures. The
budget of the European Union is really a small thing when compared with the
federal budget of the USA, a set of states comparable in size and importance to
the European states.
Over the last fifteen years, in the USA the average weight of federal total receipts
has been 18.6% of Gross National Income (GNI), while federal total expenditure
has weighted 21.3% of GNI. During the same period, total federal receipts and ex-
penditure in the EU both averaged around 1% of GNI (Figure 3). This picture is
reversed if one looks at the state and the local government levels. In the USA, total
state and local revenue and expenditure amounted, respectively, to 13.8 and 14.6%
of GNI; in the EU they were instead equal to respectively 45% and 48%.
It is not only from the quantitative point of view that the EU budget is negligible
when compared with the federal budget of the USA. In the EU there is in fact no
federal system of assessment and collection of revenues. Tax revenues are collected
by individual states, and are much more transfers from member states than actual
tax revenues of the EU. In fact, they are also recorded as receipts and expenses in
FIGURE 3. US and EU total receipts and expenditure by level of government in percentage of
GNI (source: BEA and EUROSTAT).
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the budgets of individual countries. The situation is completely different in the
USA, where the tax system is primarily a federal system, and many states use the as-
sessment of the tax base made at the federal level as a basis for calculating state and
local taxes. From this point of view, the relationship between the US federal budget
and the US state budget is similar to that which in the EU exists between each
member state’s central government and its local governments.
It is important to notice that while at the state level in the USA, expenditure and
revenue tend to balance (in some states there is either a constitutional or a statutory
balanced budget rule to the operating budget), at the federal level—in spite of the
longstanding debate about the federal debt ceiling11—deficit spending appears to be
widely practiced. In Europe, the federal budget is not only negligible for its entity,
but is also always balanced. And the EU states’ budgets are strait-laced by ever tigh-
tening fiscal rules: even in the last period, when in the USA there is both a substan-
tial increase in expenditure and a decrease in taxation, in Europe the increase in
expenditure is much more limited, while there is no decrease in taxation (see
Figure 3).
Taxes and expenditures confined to state and local government levels cannot by
definition make any redistribution at the federal level. Redistribution at the federal
level is therefore almost entirely absent in the EU, while it is relevant in the USA,
where, as in every federal union, it does not occur through discretionary actions, but
quite automatically by virtue of the fact that many taxes and federal spending pro-
grammes vary according to income. Differences in state average income levels cause
transfers of financial resources within the federation, without resorting to any kind
of intervention on a discretionary basis, and without putting in place a federal fiscal
policy differentiated between states.
This redistribution is quite different from that which would be obtained if the
system of taxes and transfers operated exclusively between the regions of a single
nation. A given level of public transfers generates the same burden for the rich
regions whether implemented at the state level or at the federal level, only if the
average per capita income in that state is equal to the average per capita income of
the whole federation. If the state’s per capita income is higher than that of the feder-
ation, a change from a state scheme to a federal scheme would imply that the rich
regions in the high income country transfer resources not only to the poorer regions
of their own state, but in part also to the poorer regions of other states.12 In this
11 On the ‘debt ceiling impasse’, see Jackson (2012).
12 This point can be illustrated by two simple numerical examples. Consider two countries, A and B,
each composed of two regions (A1 and A2, and B1 and B2). In A1, there are 50 individuals with an
income of $300 each, in A2 there are 25 individuals with an income of $150, in B1 there are 25
individuals with an income of $300, and in B2 there are 50 individuals with an income of $150. Every
individual in A2 and B2 must receive a transfer of $30. If these transfers were financed by two
independent national systems, in A1 each individual would have to pay $15, and $60 in B1. If a federal
budget is established between A and B, to achieve the same redistribution in favour of A2 and B2, each
individual in A1 and B1 must pay $30. Per capita taxes double in A1 and halve in A2. Country A
transfers $750 to country B. Alternatively, consider the case that in A1 and B1 there are 50 individuals,
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way, a scheme of taxes and transfers implemented at the federal level plays both a re-
distributive function internal to the state, and between states.
The amount of the federal redistribution between different states can only be
ascertained by a wide margin of approximation. The problem is that many federal
expenditures are not enjoyed by the state in which the expenditure is made.13 The
same problem arises for taxes.14 And we must consider that this redistribution is not
a zero-sum game, as it is possible to resort to budget deficits. These highly relevant
issues—which also occur in the EU within each state—demonstrate the slipperiness
of the ground of the calculation of whether a single territory is receiving back from
the central government more or less than what it is contributing in taxes. However,
it is undeniable that through a fiscal policy not degenerated to the point of making
the fiscal system a regressive one, the richer areas of a united territory give up
resources in favour of poorer areas, in the same way in which this takes place
between richer and poorer individuals of the same area.
Keeping in mind the complications which we have just mentioned, let us compare
the scale of redistribution operated by the US federal budget with that of the EU
federal budget.
In the USA, per capita total federal revenue collections and transfers vary signifi-
cantly in the different states. In Figure 4, all US states (with the exception of the
District of Columbia) have been ordered on the horizontal axis by level of per capita
GDP, starting from the highest. For each of them, the figure shows the difference
between federal total individual income tax and federal total direct payments to indi-
viduals, both in per capita terms. Despite the presence of some outliers, it is clear
that the richer states of the federation—as one would expect—pay much more in
taxes on personal income than the direct transfers to individuals they receive, and
vice versa for the poorer states. West Virginia and Mississippi, the two poorest states
of the federation in terms of per capita GDP, show a negative balance of US$3,900
and US$3,200, respectively. Delaware and Alaska, the two richest states, show a
positive balance of US$5,100 and US$2,500, respectively.
and 25 individuals in A2 and B2, and per capita income remains the same in every region, except in A1
where it is equal to $600. If the same transfers of the first example ($30 each in both A2 and B2) were
financed by two independent national systems, individuals in A1 would have to pay 2.5% of their income,
and individuals in B1 5%. If a federal budget is established between A and B, both A1 and B1 pay 3.33%
of their income. Country A transfers $250 to country B.
13 In the USA, for example, many elders choose to enjoy in Florida the retirement benefits provided by
the federal budget, even if they have spent their working life elsewhere. Virginia and Maryland show a
large amount of federal spending in public salaries because of their proximity to Washington, and even the
salaries of Washington federal employment allotted to the District of Columbia may not be considered an
exclusive expense of that state, since services produced by public employees in the capital benefit the
whole federation. Similarly, states in which there are companies that supply weapons to the federal
government—Texas being the most prominent example—record a high level of federal spending, even if
the service of the defense of the federation can hardly be attributed to a single state.
14 The alcohol- and tobacco-producing states pay a vast amount of taxes, but these taxes ought to be
allocated to all states in proportion to the consumption of these products. All companies which for tax
purposes register in Delaware generate federal revenues paid by Delaware, even though the value added by
these companies is actually generated in other states of the federation.
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Figure 5 gives the same information for the 27 countries of the EU, with the ex-
ception of Luxembourg. As in the USA, the balance between taxes and transfers
tends to decrease with the decrease of per capita GDP. However, in line with what
we have seen in Figure 1, we notice that the scale of this redistribution is insignifi-
cant when compared with the one made in the USA. Take for example Denmark,
the richest country in the union in terms of per capita income; it has the highest
FIGURE 5. EU total revenues minus EU total expenditures in different states (E per capita).
Year 2010 (source: EUROSTAT).
FIGURE 4. US. Per capita Federal total income taxes minus federal total direct payments to
individuals in different states (US$ per capita). Year 2010 (source: Consolidated Federal
Funds Report).
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difference between federal revenues paid and federal spending received. This
amount, however, is little more than E500—an amount which would place this state
with those North American states, such as Wisconsin and Kansas, which show a dif-
ference between personal taxes and transfers among the smallest of the federation.
There is still another point to be noticed: the EU budget not only operates
minimal redistribution, but this is made across the whole EU27, and in fact its main
beneficiaries are countries outside the 17 Euro countries (marked by an asterisk in
the figure). The only Euro countries which are net beneficiaries are Greece,
Slovakia, Portugal, Slovenia and Estonia. The whole amount of the net contribution
they receive is a mere 3 billion Euros.
IV. EXTERNAL IMBALANCES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT
From the data we have just shown, it appears that the citizens of say Delaware are
prepared to ‘donate’ a not inconsiderable part of their income to say the citizens of
Mississippi. The same as in the USA happens within each EU member state, as we
have seen in Section 1. Within each EU country—as within the USA—the state
makes possible a transfer of real resources from some areas to others through its
fiscal policy. This takes place without the necessity of creating debit and credit posi-
tions, thus the question of its sustainability does not even arise. As a matter of fact,
a creation of debit and credit positions can and will often take place if the state’s
fiscal policy entails the creation of a budget deficit, and through it the creation of
public debt. We may notice, however, that although ownership of public debt will
tend to be concentrated in the richer areas, the debt will not be owed by the poorer
regions to the richer regions. It will be a debt owed by the nation as a whole, and to
this extent it will be an internal debt, and no question of its sustainability can arise
so far as its owners are prepared to accept it in ‘payment’ for the resources they have
‘donated’ to the poorer regions. Under normal conditions, public debt would be
regarded as a first class asset, therefore the most acceptable way of settling these
claims.
It is interesting to look in this perspective at the analogous problem when a
similar transfer of resources takes place not between different areas of the same
state, but between different sovereign states. In the inter-state relationship, such a
situation must per se create credit and debit positions, since there is no super entity
which could simply ‘force’ these transfers through its tax power; the situation
could be sustainable in the longer term only so far as the creditors agree to see
their claims congealed in some acceptable assets. Even when these assets are ac-
ceptable, a settlement of the debt must however sooner or later take place in real
terms, through the transfer back to the creditor country of the real resources they
have temporarily foregone. History, however, shows examples in which the creditor
country has accepted to formally relinquish part of its product, agreeing to see its
credits indefinitely congealed in a financial asset it cannot control, and which is
therefore completely external to it (this appears to be the case of China towards
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the USA in recent decades). If the creditor is prepared to see its claims indefinitely
put on hold, there are no financial aspects which may represent an obstacle. The
crucial question is therefore to understand the reasons which could make this solu-
tion acceptable for the creditor. We think that the basis must be in the economic
advantage this would have for the creditor himself. And this advantage can be
found in the interest the creditor may have in the growth allowed by effective
demand coming from an area outside itself—an external source of demand which
is required for that growth to go on without substantially disturbing the distributive
conditions of the growing area (China is again a case in point). Of course, the
quality of the asset the creditor is receiving is an important element to make the
solution acceptable.
The case of an internal imbalance does not in essence differ from the external
one. The ‘bonds of solidarity’ between members of the same nation (common sets
of values, religion, language, etc.) are not a cogent explanation of the sustainability
of persistent imbalances within a country. Nor does it seem reasonable to attribute it
to the mere coercive power of the state: this would imply that the state could act
against the interests of the richer—thus more powerful—part of the country. Also
within a single state, the mechanism of ‘export-led’ growth just highlighted may be
an important element in the explanation of why persistent imbalances between
regions may be acceptable (a significant example may be found in the relationship
between Northern and Southern Italy, especially in the early decades after WW2, as
well as between East and West Germany after the unification).
From this particular point of view, the exchange of something for nothing
which the external imbalance generates can be seen as actually an exchange of
something for something: the external demand gives rise to an additional product
which would have not otherwise been called into existence. The portion which is
given to the deficit area is in substance ‘paid’ by the amount of product the cred-
itor area would have not enjoyed without giving part of the additional product to
the outside. In other words, what can make the situation acceptable is the enjoy-
ment by both areas of the growth dividend. This, however, does not do away with
the problem of the means of payment which render the deficit area able to pur-
chase its net imports. As we have already noticed, the difference between the
intra-state and the inter-state imbalances is to be seen in the different kinds of
assets in terms of which the payment takes place. In the former case, this means
of payment is an internal asset, which is in the power of the state or its central
bank to generate and control: within a state the balance of payments is not a cur-
rency problem. In inter-state relatonships, the balance of payments must instead
necessarily be a currency problem, because as a rule neither the state nor its
central bank has the power to create the asset necessary to settle an imbalance.
The member countries of the Euro area find themselves in a condition which is
only apparently similar to that of members of a unified currency area: they settle
their accounts in terms of a currency which is internal to the area, but (i) this cur-
rency cannot be generated by a single member state according to its needs and
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(ii) the public debt of a debtor country is not regarded as an internal asset by the
creditor country. This conflict between having a single currency and keeping sep-
arate states has in recent years shown itself in the tensions within the system of
payments of the Euro area.
V. AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK FOR A PAYMENT SYSTEM
The Euro area system of payments is the so-called TARGET system,15 which is
nothing else than the counterpart of the ISA system of payments within the
USA16—and in fact has been largely inspired by it. It is therefore worthwhile to con-
sider similarities and differences between these two systems, also in view of the fact
that the ISA system has never drawn criticisms as sharp and as relevant as those re-
cently raised—especially by German economists—against the TARGET mechanism.
In both systems, central bank settlement creates a credit in the balance sheet of
the national central bank of the country to which the payment flows, and a debt in
the balance sheet of the national central bank of the country from which the
payment originates. In both systems, these credits and debits are guaranteed and
cleared by the central bank (Fed or ECB). Yet in the ISA system, settlement occurs
every year, while in the TARGET system the final settling is on hold indefinitely.
This has misled some economists into thinking that the US system is more restrict-
ive than the European one, not allowing persistent imbalances of the current
accounts of the different member states.17 In fact, it is not.
In the first place, we must notice that imbalances in the system of payments—be
it the ISA or the TARGET system—may have nothing to do with current account
imbalances. Capital movements can create imbalances not linked to the current
account. This is most clearly shown by the case of Italy, which notwithstanding a
modest imbalance in her current account, has since July 2011 developed a substan-
tial TARGET liability, essentially driven by capital outflows. We may also notice that
ISA imbalances may be generated by pure financial movements which have nothing
to do with either current account imbalances or with net financial investments –
e.g., ISA transactions generated by the fact that not all district central banks act as
fiscal agents and depositories for the US Treasury, or by the fact that not all district
central banks have the same role in the Fed’s open market operations.18 Most im-
portantly, even when ISA imbalances reflect imbalances in the current accounts of
the different districts, the assets through which the imbalances are settled do not
share the same nature as gold certificates or foreign reserves19: final settlement is
15 For a clear exposition of the main characteristics of the TARGET system, see Whelan (2012). See
also Cecioni & Ferrero (2012).
16 For a clear exposition of the ISA system, see Koning (2012).
17 Cfr. Sinn & Wollmersha¨user (2012, p. 496 ff).
18 In other words, the same transactions would result in a completely different picture of ISA
imbalances if the Fed ran open market operations through a different district bank than the NY Fed, or
used as fiscal agent and depositories a district bank rather than another.
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achieved through shifts in holdings of the System Open Market Account (SOMA),
which is the pool of dollar-denominated assets acquired via open market operations
by district central banks on behalf of the Fed, and allocated among each of them
according to their needs. Put more explicitly, the settlement operated by the Fed
consists in a transfer of central bank money itself, not of assets (such as gold certifi-
cates or foreign reserves) it cannot create.
The SOMA portfolio consists largely of US treasury securities.20 Normally, there-
fore, the regulation between different federal districts takes place by ‘shifting’ public
debt securities held in the Fed SOMA portfolio from a district central bank to
another. If a similar settlement were to be made in the TARGET system, it would
be made by transferring say Greek public debt to the Bundesbank. It is difficult to
think that a settlement of this kind could be more acceptable than the present one
to the creditor country, given that its TARGET credit is just the result of its failure
to export capital to the debtor countries. Under the present system, the creditor
countries are ‘paid’ by recording a credit in their TARGET accounts. Also this form
of payment seems to be unsatisfactory to them, and in fact it has been suggested
that either a cap be put on the accumulation of TARGET debit positions—which
would however mean the end of the Euro system21—or that TARGET imbalances
19 The ISA system was established in 1935, replacing the Gold Settlement Account system (GSA). In
the GSA, interdistrict balances had ultimately to be paid on a daily basis in gold certificates. Each district
bank had to meet the minimum threshold of $1 million in gold certificates. The end of the GSA
coincided with the gold confiscation and the withdrawal from circulation of gold certificates (the
Emergency Banking Act of 1933). Since then, treasury bills have acquired increasing importance with
respect to gold certificates in the balance sheet of the central bank. A new type of gold certificate was
issued only to Federal Reserve banks, and did not appear in circulation (since January 1935 it was not
even printed). In the following decades, these ‘new’ gold certificates played a role of declining importance
as a regulator of the amount of high powered money. In 1965, the requirement for the maintenance of
reserves in gold certificates by Federal Reserve banks against Federal Reserve bank deposit liabilities was
abolished; in 1968, the remaining provision under which the Federal Reserve banks were required to
maintain reserves in gold certificates against Federal Reserve notes was also abolished. Gold certificates
did not play a role in regulating the money supply, that role was restricted to settle credits and debts across
federal district banks in the ISA account. In 1975 also this function was abolished. The imbalances
between district banks are settled through treasury bills on an annual basis. The gold certificates are today
still transferred between district banks, but with the sole purpose of assuring that the amount each bank
has in its gold certificate account be equal to the System’s average of gold certificates to Federal Reserve
notes outstanding. In other words, the gold certificates move following the movement of banknotes
between districts, and not the movement of the money supply as a whole.
20 At the end of 2006, of the $875 billion of total assets of the Federal Reserve’s consolidated balance
sheet, about $780 billion were in the domestic SOMA portfolio, which comprised only Treasury
securities. On this, see Carpenter et al. (2012).
21 ‘In a modern, well-functioning economy with a sound financial system, the general public does not
draw a distinction between central bank money and commercial bank money, as commercial bank money
can easily be converted into central bank money such as banknotes and coins at par. In other words,
exchange rates exist between different currencies, while there is a one-to-one “conversion rate” between
the two components of a given currency. An essential feature of a national payment system is the fact that
it involves the circulation of two types of money which are of uniform value. Preserving the uniform value
of the currency is a key task entrusted to the central bank. It is important that a currency have a uniform
value, as otherwise a currency cannot perform its “unit of account” function in an effective manner. If
banks’ liabilities had different values, different prices would have to be set for every good or service for
each of the bank monies used, i.e. depending on whether a consumer paid with the liabilities of one bank
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be settled by bonds ‘collateralised by each corresponding government with
state-owned real estate or senior rights to future tax revenue’.22
The means of payment which in the Euro area seem unacceptable to creditor
countries are on the other hand perfectly acceptable in the USA. Treasuries are
gilt-edged securities. Their price is administered by the central bank. They circulate
at par in the whole federal area. The interest rate charged by the central bank is
unique in all districts. In Europe, the situation is different. Public debt is issued by
different governments. This would not in itself constitute a problem, insofar as the
ECB were prepared to guarantee that the treasury bills of all member countries cir-
culate at par in the whole Euro area. In this case, the public debt of European coun-
tries, even if issued by different states, would be standardized in the same way as US
treasury bills. This would seem to be a necessary outcome of a monetary union: if
in a currency area the price of deposits with the banking systems of two different
states is the same (i.e. there is uniformity in the value of commercial bank money),
it seems natural that there also be a single price for the securities against which
central bank money is issued (i.e. there must also be a single interest rate). Yet, in
Europe there is no fixing of the price of public debts, since the ECB—in the same
way as the Fed with respect to state and local debts—is unwilling to uniform the rate
of interest paid on the public debt of different countries, thus giving the market a
role in setting the price of different government securities. The treasury bills of
some states circulate at a discount. This in itself does not result in immediate failure
of the monetary union, and in fact at present in Europe a single currency and inter-
est rate differentials coexist. But whereas a single currency would imply the absence
of a balance of payments constraint, the plurality of interest rates shows the unwill-
ingness of the creditor countries to accept a settlement in terms of the public
debts—in other words, the presence of a balance of payments constraint.
That unwillingness cannot be explained by mere mercantilist obtusity on the part
of the creditor countries; the settlement of a debt in terms of a financial asset, not in
real terms, to be acceptable requires either a great strength or a great weakness on
the part of the debtor. If the debtor is very powerful, the creditor has a sufficient
confidence in his paper. If the debtor is very weak, the creditor has a firm grip on
him and his real assets. The debtor countries in the EU fulfil neither of these two
conditions: they are weaker than the creditor, but at the same time they are not com-
pletely at its mercy—European states are still there.23
As we have noticed, European creditor states prefer to be paid in central bank
money rather than with paper issued by the debtor states. A settlement in money
or another. If the uniform value of the currency was not guaranteed, there would, in effect, be multiple
currencies within what is meant to be a single currency area, thereby creating a major obstacle to trade in
what is meant to be a single market’ (ECB, 2010, p. 45).
22 See Sinn (2012, p.2). For a criticism, see Whelan (2012, p. 41).
23 ‘It would certainly be no solution to allow the deficit countries to settle their balances with normal
government bonds that they issue themselves. That would be akin to jumping from the frying pan into the
fire’ (Sinn 2012, p. 2).
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guaranteed by the central bank is the settlement par excellence for the single individ-
ual creditor, but this settlement does not appear as a fully satisfactory solution for
the creditor state as a whole. For the creditor state as a whole, in fact, the only sense
in which this settlement may be considered useful is in its allowing an expansion of
domestic credit that would have not been otherwise possible. But recording a
TARGET credit may not be a necessary condition to enlarge its monetary base. A
creditor country may well be in a position such that the monetary policy of the ECB
could already be sufficient to meet the needs of its domestic credit. Thus the only
effect of the monetary base created through TARGET would be to substitute it for
loans to banks from the national central bank. Indeed, this is what has happened in
Germany in the last two years, when the Bundesbank’s balance sheet saw incre-
ments of TARGET credits accompanied by reductions in loans to banks (see
Whelan, 2012, fig. 4, p. 15). This does not mean that the TARGET balances
crowded out domestic credit, but it is undeniable that the same amount of domestic
credit could have been largely assured without that TARGET credit.
For a US federal district, whether reserves are created through credit towards
another district or through normal open market operations is equally acceptable.
For the creditor countries in the Euro area it is not, and in fact they are showing in-
creasing unwillingness to have their exports paid in the common currency. This is
another way of saying that within the Euro area the balance of payments constraint
is still present. In the last resort, Euro creditor countries want their exports to Euro
countries not to be paid in Euro but in gold and foreign currency reserves.24
VI. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND AUSTERITY RULES IN A COMMON
CURRENCY AREA
One of the main characteristics of a state is that within it there is no balance of pay-
ments constraint. We could almost say that what qualifies a state as such is that it
brings together a group of areas among which an exchange of something for nothing
is acceptable, and the problem of the financial means which render this possible is
always solved. The basis of this solution is neither a charitable disposition of the rich
areas towards the poor, nor that the poor are able to trick the rich into waiving a
portion of their product. It is rather—as we have argued—the growth dividend,
which is shared by both.
Fiscal policy is at the root of the working of the growth dividend mechanism, in
that it, on the one hand allows the transfer of part of the product from one area to
another, and on the other hand (through its expansionary effects) enhances growth.
24 In 2002, 82% of the external position of the Bundesbank was made of gold, special drawing rights,
foreign currency reserves and other claims on non-Euro area residents, while 18% was made of claims
within the Euro system and other claims on residents in other Euro area member states. In 2012, they
were, respectively, 20% and 80% (see Bundesbank 2013, p. 73, table 9). On Germany’s export-led growth
strategy centred on absorption from the other Euro area countries, see Cesaratto (2011).
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The decades of high growth after WW2 have shown the working of the mechan-
isms we have tried to highlight, and have had the result of strengthening the territor-
ial cohesion within the states. Even between different states the need to settle the
accounts has never got to the point of plunging civilized countries back into worship
of the ‘barbarous relic’, and threatening the very existence of a modern system of
payments.
It is by now clear that the establishment of the Euro as a single currency has not
worked as a means to overcome the external debt within the area, and its member
states, deprived of a central bank, have no other means of managing external imbal-
ances than imposing stern austerity rules. The failure of the EU to tend towards a
significant federal fiscal policy has confirmed one of the main points of the neglected
MacDougall report on the role of public finance in the European Union: without at-
tributing a major role to the redistributing function of public finance ‘monetary
union is impracticable’ (MacDougall et al., 1977, p. 12). This would have of course
required nothing less than the establishment of a single European state.
In the present context, it would be difficult for an individual state to unilaterally
implement expansionary policies. A redistributive fiscal policy is hindered by wild
forms of tax competition among EU countries. In a highly integrated area, region-
specific expansionary fiscal policies generate strong leakages. These expansionary
policies can only be deficit spending policies which would feed current account
imbalances. The public debt thus generated would be incurred by a single state initi-
ating the expansion, and would come to be mirrored in an external debt. The
country starting the expansion would reap just a small fraction of the expansion, and
would also see its external debt growing. As we have seen, the creditor countries
would not put on hold the corresponding claims, but would rather use these claims
to put pressure on the debtor country. These would be significant obstacles to the
action of a single country, the removal of which would require substantial departures
from the well-established setting of the ‘four fundamental freedoms’ on which the
current European economic order is based: freedom of movement for capital,
people, goods and services.
A common policy would indeed not be met by these obstacles. The fact is,
however, that the tendency at the European level is rather the opposite of that
recommended by the MacDougall Report, and every reduction of the federal budget
is hailed as a victory by member states. No European state appears to be willing to
base an expansionary policy on the growth of domestic demand—this would require
a significant change in the distributive outlook within these countries. This is par-
ticularly evident in the creditor countries, which could to some extent pursue such
policies individually, but do not even mildly attempt to do so. This appears to be
true also for the debtor countries. The unwillingness of the creditor countries to
somehow relax their debtors’ external constraint in the last resort allows the debtor
countries to pursue restrictive policies which reinforce the present tendencies
towards unequal distribution, justifying them as a choice forced upon them from the
outside. All European countries are looking for an export-led growth, which would
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indeed be a squaring of the circle. The present policies appear not only to threat the
whole European construction, but have started to cause a strong push towards disin-
tegration of the single states, where the richer areas clamour against the poorer
areas, showing increasing unwillingness to forego part of their product in their
favour. This is most evident in countries like Italy, where of course there is no
growth dividend to speak of: not only has her product substantially decreased since
the inception of the crisis, but the country has been stagnating for the best part of
the last two decades.
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